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1  PART 6 
Boundaries of 
the agent 
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1  CHAPTER 15 
 Extended vision 
 Robert A.  Wilson 
 Abstract 
 Vision constitutes an interesting domain, or range of domains, for debate over the extended mind 
thesis: the idea that minds extend physically beyond the boundaries of the body.  In part this 
is because vision (and visual experience more particularly) are sometimes presented as a kind of 
line in the sand for what we might call  externalist creep about the mind: once all reasonable conces-
sions have been made to externalists about the mind, visual experience marks a line beyond which 
lies a safe haven for individualists.  Here I want to put a little more pressure on such a view of visual 
experience, as well as to offer a more constructive, positive argument in defence of the idea of 
extended vision. 
 15.1.  Vision, visual experience, and the extended mind 
 Vision is a domain in which two sets of competing considerations clash. On the one hand, the notion 
of a perceptual  system is relatively well entrenched in the cognitive sciences, and even some of the 
most trenchant critics of the extended mind thesis (e.g. Adams and Aizawa,  2008 ,  2009 ) are prepared 
to allow that cognitive systems may be extended. Since the version of the extended mind thesis 
I favour is most naturally expressed in terms of the extension of cognitive systems beyond bodily 
boundaries (Wilson,  1994 ,  2004 , chapters 4–8), perceptual domains in general seem to be pre-
adapted (as it were) as likely domains for which the extended mind thesis is defensible. On the other 
hand, not every aspect of cognition and cognitive processing is extended. Perceptual  phenomenology 
in general, and the phenomenology of visual experience in particular, has been the first port of call 
for those with individualistic intuitions about the mind ( sensu Burge,  1979 ,  1986 ). The idea that my 
perception of the world,  how the world seems to me from the inside , might be  exactly as it is , even were 
I not the embodied, world-enmeshed being that I actually am, but merely a brain in a vat (or were 
Descartes’ evil demon hypothesis true), has both motivated and sustained individualistic thinking 
about the mind since before the time that there were individualists as such (see also Wilson, 
forthcoming). 
 I have argued previously (Wilson,  2004 , chapter 9) that at least some of the various phenomena 
collected under the rubric of consciousness (higher order thought, introspection, and some aspects 
of attention) fall under the umbrella of the extended mind thesis, and that at least some aspects of 
visual experience should be viewed likewise (ibid., 232–38). There I also resisted what I called  global 
externalism , the view that the extended mind thesis is true across the board for all mental phenom-
ena, opting for a kind of pluralistic view of the mind vis-à-vis the debate over individualism, whereby 
individualistic and externalist views of cognition divide the mind between them. This moderate 
externalist view allows that some cognitive systems are individualistic; I have suggested previously 
(ibid., pp. 238–40) that the nociceptive system that realizes pain is a likely example. 
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1  In this chapter, I want to reconsider such pluralism, and to put a little more pressure in particular 
on an individualistic treatment of visual systems and visual experience in light of that reconsidera-
tion. I shall offer a more constructive, positive argument in defence of the idea that vision is extended, 
aiming to shift the balance of power in any pluralistic coalition further towards externalism. As part 
of this discussion of the question of whether visual systems and the experiences they generate are 
extended, I will also take up the question of whether they are embodied. Some individualists about 
visual experience (e.g. Block,  2005 ; Aizawa,  2007 ) have denied the embodiment of vision in anything 
but a fairly weak sense, e.g., we happen to have bodies that are causally important to vision in the 
actual world. 
 I have indicated that visual experience has been a sort of first port of call for individualists. More 
recently, however, visual experience has become the last refuge for individualism about the mind: 
visual experience has been taken to be a phenomenon that, after all reasonable concessions have been 
made to externalists, remains a safe haven for individualists. Ned Block captures this individualistic 
view of visual experience neatly in a recent, prominent review of Alva Noë’s  Action in Perception in 
considering the claim that perceptual experience is essentially embodied. Block denies this claim, 
saying that ‘the minimal constitutive supervenience base for perceptual experience is the brain and 
does not include the rest of the body’ (Block,  2005 , p. 271). The intuition that Block’s own claim 
about perceptual experience draws on is: that whatever the precise material realization of perceptual 
experience consists in, it does not extend beyond the brain. This intuition expresses a widely accepted 
‘embrained view’ of the mind, and such  embrainment is incompatible with the  embodiment of the 
mind. Moreover, if perceptual experience is not embodied because its material realization does not 
extend beyond the brain into the body, then it would also seem that the mind is not extended for that 
very same reason. 
 I will try to show not only why I think that Block’s claim here is false, but why this, in turn, 
provides reason to view perception not only as embodied but also as extended. In short, rather than 
argue (along with Block) that the failure of perceptual experience to be embodied implies that it is 
not extended, I will argue that precisely because perceptual experience is embodied, it is also extended. 
In fact, if the line of argument that I am developing is on track, then the physical embodiment 
and physical extension of at least some forms of perception are tightly entwined facts about how 
the corresponding perceptual systems operate (cf. Gallagher,  2005 ; Myin and O’Regan,  2009 ; 
Noë,  2009 ). 
 Whether this is true  only of perception because of specific ways in which perception is embodied, 
or true more generally (e.g. of consciousness; cf. Prinz,  2009 ; Clark, submitted), is something that 
I leave open here. In fact, my concern will be almost exclusively with  visual perception and  visual 
experience , bringing in other perceptual modalities only insofar as they shed light on vision. 
Discussions of vision that are partially cast in terms of broader notions, such as perception or even 
consciousness, can sometimes be misleading, especially when probing into what it is that vision 
 requires or what it is that is necessary or sufficient for  visual experience. 
 15.2.  Loosening the skullcap 
 In order to loosen the screws on the individualistic skullcap about perception, consider two kinds of 
cases, one concerning perceptual  systems , the other perceptual  experience . 
 The first are cases in which organisms generate a sensory field that they then move through in 
order to achieve basic biological goals, such as mating and prey-detection. Bats and electric fish are 
two of the better-known examples of such creatures. Where is the boundary of  their sensory systems, 
given that their self-generated sensory fields are located beyond their bodily boundaries? At first 
glance, their sensory systems, and indeed the sensory processing they engage in, do not begin and end 
at their bodily boundaries, since they use their bodies to generate electromagnetic or sonic fields 
beyond those bodies. In any case, exploring just how such creatures function successfully in the 
world is relevant to answering the questions. Attention to the mechanistic and computational details 
of that functioning push against, I shall later argue, at least some of the individualistic intuitions 
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1 behind Block’s claim (Section 5). What they suggest specifically about perceptual  experience is some-
thing I will return to. 
 The second are cases that are more directly relevant for thinking about perceptual experience, and 
they help to frame issues about  visual experience in a particular way. Consider not perceptual experi-
ence in general but  tactile experience in particular. Does the minimal constitutive supervenience base 
for tactile experience include only the brain and exclude the rest of the body? Precisely the same 
question could be asked of  orgasmal experience or the experience of  physical pain (that associated 
with breaking one’s leg). All three kinds of experience seem to be more intimately related to the body 
than are visual, auditory, and olfactory experience, as reflected in common reference to them as 
 bodily experiences. The experience, in each case, is  felt in the body , and the material realization of the 
experience as it actually occurs involves sensors in, on, and nerves that run through, the body. 
(Whether the appearances in ordinary cases are merely apparent, or this is true of  all bodily experi-
ence, such as in cases of pain felt in phantom limbs, I leave aside here.) If at least some kinds of 
perceptual experiences are bodily experiences, in this sense, then the embodiment of perceptual expe-
rience more generally, and of visual experience in particular, is cast in a new light (see section 15.7). 
 These cases are introduced here as suggestive screw-looseners, but it is worth saying a little more 
about which screws on the individualistic skullcap about perception they aim to loosen. I take the 
first kind of case, involving apparently extended sensory fields, to suggest that whether the corre-
sponding perceptual system ends at the body is in part an empirical question, and the second kind of 
case, involving bodily experience, to suggest the same about the issue of whether  all experience 
supervenes only on the brain to the exclusion of the rest of the body. Ultimately, I shall argue that 
such suggestions not only loosen the skullcap on thinking about perception and perceptual experi-
ence; they also provide the bases for an argument for the extended vision thesis. The full defence 
of that argument will require showing how it avoids some of the now-standard objections to argu-
ments for the extended mind thesis, or their analogues for perception, such as a putative ‘coupling/ 
constitution fallacy’, and a failure to consider the significance of the distinction between cognitive 
 systems and cognitive  processes (Adams and Aizawa,  2008 ,  2009 ; Block,  2005 ). For now, it is enough 
if these suggestions challenge non-externalists to entertain the prospect that individualism about 
perception and perceptual experience is not as secure a position as is often assumed. This is a kind of 
 externalist creep (I’ve been called worse). I want to turn next to briefly recount a broader and perhaps 
more familiar externalist creep in philosophy of mind over the past 35 years or so, primarily for those 
unfamiliar with the trajectory of the debate over individualism and externalism in the philosophy 
of mind. 
 15.3.  Externalist creep 
 Contemporary externalist thinking about the mind originates in the work of Hilary Putnam ( 1975 ) 
and Tyler Burge ( 1979 ). The arguments of Putnam and Burge appeal, respectively, to the attribution 
of ‘meaning’ or belief in counterfactual circumstances. Both Putnam and Burge acknowledge the 
debt of their views to earlier works, including their own, on the causal theory of reference, particu-
larly as it applied to both proper names and natural kind terms in natural languages. Here we have 
our first instance of externalist creep: from the philosophy of language to the philosophy of mind. 
Given this starting point, two individualistic responses which concede that the Putnam-Burge 
thought experiments show some form of externalism about mental representation to be true, are 
natural. 
 The first kind of individualistic response (Field,  1978 ; Loar,  1981 ; McGinn,  1982 ) was to argue for 
‘two factor’ theories of mental content, where one factor is externalist (or ‘wide’), the other individu-
alistic (or ‘narrow’). The most common ways to develop an account of narrow content have been 
either as a form of conceptual role semantics, or by analogy with David Kaplan’s notion of  character 
in his semantics (see Wilson,  1995 , chapter 9 for discussion). 
 The second kind of individualistic response (Fodor,  1982 ) was to argue that while conceptual 
content is externalist,  non-conceptual content, as exemplified in unarticulated perceptual experience, 
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1 is individualistic. As philosophical attention shifted its focus from the problem of intentionality to 
the problem of consciousness during the 1990s, more sophisticated defences of the idea that phenom-
enology (especially  visual phenomenology) was individualistic have appeared (e.g. Loar,  2002 ,  2003 ; 
Horgan and Tienson,  2002 ). While the focus here is squarely on the first-person phenomenology of 
our mental states, these efforts are an attempt to reinvigorate the narrow content programme about 
intentionality by arguing that ‘phenomenal intentionality’ was individualistic. The basic idea of these 
views is that there is a kind of intentionality, phenomenal intentionality, determined by one’s 
phenomenology (how the world seems to one at a given time) that is individualistic. Although the 
view is intended to apply to mental states more generally, sensory experience has been presented as a 
paradigm of where one could locate phenomenal intentionality (see Wilson,  2003 ,  2004 , chapter 10 
for discussion). 
 This section has reprised briefly a central strand to the individualist–externalist debate, one that 
has focused on mental representation, intentionality, and content. The central question here, as it 
pertains to vision, has been something like this: is the content of visual experience, or our visual 
phenomenology, individuated individualistically? Aficionados of the individualism–externalism 
debate will have followed discussions of this kind of question in the context of Marr’s theory of 
vision, where there has been sustained attention to the question of whether Marr’s theory was exter-
nalist (Burge,  1986 ; Shapiro,  1997 ) or individualistic (Segal,  1989 ) or neither (Egan,  1992 ; Chomsky, 
 1995 ) about content. Here we can note another kind of externalist creep: from externalist claims 
about folk psychology (e.g. belief) to externalist claims about cognitive science (e.g. zero-point cross-
ings and 2.5 D sketches in Marr’s theory; see also Wilson,  2004 , chapter 7). Yet none of these views 
have considered the question that is now at the forefront of contemporary debate between individu-
alists and externalists: does the mind itself extend physically beyond the physical boundary of the 
body? Those who answer affirmatively (Clark and Chalmers,  1998 ; Clark,  2007 ,  2008 , in press; 
Hurley,  1998 ; Wilson,  2000 ,  2004 , in press; Wilson and Clark,  2009 ) defend the  extended mind thesis. 
Those who answer negatively (Adams and Aizawa,  2001 ,  2008 ,  2009 ; Rupert,  2004 ; Prinz,  2009 ) view 
that thesis as resting on one or more errors. They hold, instead, that the ‘vehicles’ of cognition are 
bound by the head. The  extended vision thesis is an instance of the extended mind thesis that applies 
to vision; an early version of it was defended in my ‘Wide Computationalism’”through discussion of 
the multispatial channels theory of form perception and of work on animal navigation systems 
(Wilson,  1994 . See also Wilson,  1995 , chapter 3). It is to an argument for this thesis that I now turn. 
 15.4.  An argument for the extended vision thesis 
 One general consideration that opens up ground for taking the extended vision thesis seriously 
is that cognitive systems that have evolved through world-mind constancies are good candidates 
for extended cognition (Clark,  1989 ,  1993 , chapter 6; Wilson,  1995 , chapter 4). Together with 
what Andy Clark ( 1989 , p.64) has called the  007 Principle for organisms engaged in costly internal 
processing – ‘know only as much as you need to know to get the job done’ – this consideration 
suggests that we should expect to find cognitive systems designed to rely on world-mind constancies 
to perform their function, rather than form and compute complex internal representations, when 
such constancies are there to exploit. Visual systems are often in just this position. 
 Over the past 15 years, a number of new accounts of visual processing have taken up a question 
that is very much in the background of such general considerations, and in so doing, have made the 
extended vision thesis more plausible. That question concerns the global function of vision: what it 
is that vision, as a whole,  is for . Answering questions about the global function of any biological 
structure, capacity, or behaviour are far from straightforward, turning at least in part on organismal 
and lineage history, current utility, and the relationship between them. But at least one defensible 
epistemic handle on this question is to ask what it is that vision allows organisms who have it to do 
that those without it either cannot do, or at best do in a much more constrained and cumbersome 
way. The particular argument for the extended vision thesis that I shall discuss appeals, in the first 
instance, to the global function of visual systems. 
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1  To a large extent, the question ‘What is vision for?’ has not been centre-stage in traditional theories 
of perceptual processing. When it has been asked, the answer given has been something like this: 
vision is for recording some kind of raw imprint of the world, which then gets processed ‘down-
stream’ to arrive at a reconstruction of the world in terms of concepts and categories (in organisms 
that have such tools) that are employed either consciously or unconsciously. Human vision in partic-
ular, and human perception more generally, is ‘for’ cognition: vision extracts information from the 
world to deliver inputs to various cognitive processes. Insofar as access to visual information results 
in a massively enriched database on which cognitive processes can operate, vision is for the enhance-
ment of cognition and, eventually, action. 
 A range of recent theories of vision (including O’Regan and Noë’s [2001] sensorimotor theory of 
perception, Ballard’s [Ballard et al.,  1987 ] animate vision programme, Milner and Goodale’s [ 1998 ] 
dual systems account of visual perception, and Matthen’s [ 2005 ] action-oriented account of percep-
tion as sensory sorting) have provided variants of a different answer to this question (see Wilson, 
2006). They all hold that  vision is for guiding action . While this is not the only function performed by 
every visual system, including those that humans have, it is the ‘big thing’ that vision is for. The 
global function of vision is to allow individuals to get around in the world. Only mobile organisms 
have vision, and the visual systems that organisms are equipped with, when those systems are work-
ing as they ought to, ultimately guide their action. More specifically, the overarching function of 
vision is to guide action via the processing of a certain kind of information: visual information. 
 If the guidance of action is the ultimate function of visual systems, then what follows? To answer 
this question, consider another: how is it that visual systems achieve this function of guiding action 
through distal visual information? One way to do so would be to make an internal, encoded repre-
sentation of what is in the world, and then, combining this with other internal representations, use 
internally stored computational rules to deliver outputs that serve as inputs to internal motor 
programmes that, in turn, generate action. This presents what we might call a  flow through model of 
visual representation and visually guided action, whereby visual representations are formed inter-
nally and flow through the agent’s cognitive system to generate, eventually, actions and behaviours. 
 Such flow through models have dominated how visual representation has been conceptualized, 
perhaps because such models fit so tidily with the conception of vision as a feeder process that  delivers 
raw ‘sensation-like’ representations to cognition central and with standard computational views of 
vision (Marr, 1982). They also instantiate what Susan Hurley has called the  Input-Output picture of 
perception and action, which ‘conceives of perception as input from the world to the mind and 
action as output from the mind to the world’ (1998, p. 288). To be sure, flow through models have 
not been articulated with the conception of visual systems as being for the guidance of action in 
mind, but instead within a framework that holds that what vision is for is the provisioning of cogni-
tive processing. Perhaps not surprisingly then, on these models, most attention has been focused on 
the nature of the encoding from world to mind, and to the character of the resulting internal repre-
sentations. However, flow through models are not the only way to think about how visual systems 
operate, and they are not all that plausible as general models of how visual systems achieve their goal 
of guiding action. In part, this is because in the absence of basic bodily actions, such as physiological 
nystagmus and saccadic eye movement, many visual systems do not operate at all, or do so only in 
degraded or radically modified ways. As Steve Palmer notes with regard to the absence of the former, 
‘[I]f a patterned stimulus is presented to the eyes without any retinal motion whatsoever for more 
than a few seconds, the pattern completely disappears!’ (Palmer  1999 , p. 521). Moreover, in part, this 
is because the kinds of rich, internal structures that flow through models require do not seem to be 
as ubiquitous in vision as researchers had assumed they were. On flow through models, all that 
bodily actions can do is to re-position the organism to produce novel inputs, or stabilize the perceiver 
so that inputs remain fixed over time. On these models, representations themselves cannot be 
enriched through later stage processes, such as motor output, except in such ‘indirect’ ways. 
 The chief alternative to viewing visual information as flowing through from perceptual to 
cognitive (then to motor) systems is to take the systems that process such information as  feedback 
systems . In such systems, information is fed back  to the very same system in completing that system’s 
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1 task processing . Such feedback can take place entirely at the level of encoding, but it can also involve 
feedback that does not form such an internal loop. The kind of representation that such boundary-
crossing feedback systems traffic in can be partial and improvisational, including cases in which 
visual representation is a form of what I have elsewhere (Wilson,  2004 , chapter. 8) called  exploitative 
representation (see also Shapiro,  1997 ). Rather than taking a representational fix on the world, and 
then having those representations transformed internally as they flow through the organism to 
generate visually guided action, in exploitative visual representation, the activity of representing 
exploits whatever resources it can to generate the appropriate action. Importantly, exploitative repre-
sentation can rely on  the body’s own structures and behaviours in its activity of representing, with 
relevant bodily actions (in the first instance, eye-movements of various kinds, foveation, head- 
turning, squinting)constituting, and not simply causing, a key part of an overall perception–action 
cycle that manifests not informational flow through, but informational feedback. 
 To summarize this point: I have been drawing a contrast between two views of vision that give 
different answers to two questions. Concerning the question  what is vision for? , the traditional view 
holds that vision is for encoding information from the world for downstream cognitive processing, 
while recent views that cluster under the heading of embodied approaches hold that vision is for 
guiding action via visual information. Concerning the question  how does vision operate? , traditional 
views offer what I called flow through models, while embodied views suggest that vision functions via 
boundary-crossing feedback mechanisms that link perception to action. As I have indicated, tradi-
tional encoding, flow through views of vision can adapt in the direction of action-oriented views of 
the function of vision, but there is somewhat of an awkward fit here with the overall separability of 
perception and action. Likewise, such views could attempt to incorporate feedback as part of how 
visual systems operate, but again this adjustment to traditional views leads to positions with some 
instability to them. Either kind of move pushes one from separating perception and action as distinct, 
determinable, cognitive natural kinds towards the view that perception and action are more  intimately 
related than such a view allows. 
 Susan Hurley’s  Consciousness in Action was a watershed in breaking the grip that the flow through 
view of perceptual representation has had on philosophers and cognitive scientists alike. One of its 
important contributions was in arguing against individualists about perception on very much their 
own turf. In doing so, Hurley provided at times a painstaking critical review of thought experiments 
(e.g. Twin Earth, Inverted Earth) that had been used in support of individualistic conclusions about 
perceptual content, and introduced discussion of actual experiments (e.g. work with inverted lenses 
by Ivo Kohler and by James Taylor; Paul Bach-y-Rita’s development of tactile-visual substitution 
systems). While the negative point of Hurley’s discussion was to call into question some of the large-
scale frameworks in terms of which perception (and consciousness) had been conceptualized, the 
alternative, positive perspective on vision as involving dynamic perception-action cycles suggests a 
view of perception and action as being integrated much more tightly than often depicted by both 
philosophers and cognitive scientists. On the view that Hurley shares with many others who take the 
function of vision to be the guidance of organismic action, it is not simply that our visual systems are 
causally hooked up to (the rest of) our brains/bodies, or that these systems deliver sensory outputs 
to (the rest of) the brain/body, which then executes motor routines. Rather, what is usually thought 
of as the human visual system (starting at the retina and terminating in one or another area of visual 
cortex) is  coupled integratively with the non-neural body via a sequence of bodily actions. This use 
of the body, this body-in-action, creates and stabilizes a chain of representations tied directly 
to actions. 
 Although I have said that visual systems are embodied ‘in a fairly strong sense’, it is important to 
note that this is not the strongest possible sense in which one might speak of the embodiment of 
vision. The claim is not that visual systems are  necessarily parts of bodies, or that it is impossible 
to have functioning visual systems that are removed from, or even temporarily causally disengaged 
from, the rest of the body. Both of these stronger claims seem to me to be clearly false. This is not, 
however, because the body merely provides causal inputs to perception through its actions, nor 
because bodies (for some reason) fail to realize visual processing. Rather, it is chiefly because of 
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1 general facts about how complex, modularly decomposable systems operate. Such systems in general 
do not have  any parts that are strictly necessary, since one can substitute functionally equivalent parts 
for any given part. That, I think, is one of the implications of functional decomposition, however 
constrained actual substitutions might be given actual circumstances. Yet since this is true as much 
of ‘brain parts’ as of ‘bodily parts’, it does little to soften the claim that vision is embodied. Physical 
bodily parts need not be subject to theses that are stronger than those that hold true of physical 
neural parts; neural parts are, after all, just body parts with a particular location, composition, and 
range of functions. 
 I hope to have said enough about the starting points of the argument for extended vision that I am 
making now to lay out the whole argument more explicitly. The argument runs as follows: 
 1. The function of some visual processes is to guide action via visual information. 
 2. A primary way to achieve that function is through the active embodiment of visual processing (in 
a fairly strong sense). 
 3. Visual processes are actively embodied (in that same fairly strong sense) just if in their normal 
operation in natural environments, these processes are  coupled with bodily activities so as to form 
an  integrated system with  functional gain . But 
 4. Visual processes that are actively embodied, in this sense, are also extended. 
 Some visual processes, and the visual systems those processes physically constitute, are extended. 
 The argument begins, at (1), with a claim about the function of some visual processes, and is based 
on my discussion of the more general global function of vision. Premise (2) purports to identify the 
active embodiment of visual processing as  one way , albeit an important way, in which this function 
is achieved, at least in human beings and other mobile material beasts with which we are familiar. 
The third makes more precise what I mean by the active embodiment of vision, while the fourth 
draws a link between active embodiment and extended vision. Yet (3) requires further explication, 
not least of all because it is cast in terms of a notion that I have mentioned but not explained so far, 
that of  functionally gainful, integrative coupling . And (4) has not been discussed at all. To work! 
 15.5.  External sensory systems: Back to bats 
and electric fish 
 Let us return first to some of the cases mentioned in section 15.2: those of organisms, such as bats, 
which use self-generated sonic fields for navigation and prey detection, and electric fish, which gener-
ate weak electric fields for the same purposes. Just as the examples of inverting lenses and tactile 
visual substitution systems provide the basis for viewing perception as embodied in a fairly strong 
sense, these examples provide grounds for taking perception to be  extended in that same fairly strong 
sense. In such cases, organisms expend energy in creating a field (acoustic or electric in these cases) 
that they then interact with through motion in order to hunt, feed, mate, or navigate. I suspect that 
it would be at best very strained to argue that these fields do not physically constitute part of the 
sensory system of these organisms (and are, instead, say, simply resources used by, or inputs to, 
bodily-bounded sensory systems) as a broader consideration of their sensory ecology and evolution 
implies. These sensory systems are, in Richard Dawkins’s ( 1982 ) terms,  extended phenotypes of the 
organism; they are adaptations that have been selected for, much as their  internal sensory physiology 
has. In at least these cases, sensory systems are extended, and they provide examples of a fairly radical 
form of ‘vehicle externalism’ about the mind, one that does not appeal to intuitions about mental 
content, or claims about what happens on Twin Earth (or if there is an evil demon). In such cases, a 
slab of sensory processing, some of which is almost certainly computational, takes place outside of 
the body of the organism, as MacIver ( 2009 ) has argued recently. Still, might all the computation that 
underpins bat echolocation be going on solely in the bat’s brain? 
 One function of such extended sensory systems is to ease the ‘in-the-head’ computational and 
representational load, much as is the case of sensory off-loading where  non-sensory body parts, such 
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1 as the forelimbs of the legs of crickets, are recruited as part of an overall sensory function (in this case, 
phonotaxis). By redistributing computation beyond the nervous system, adaptive behaviour is clearly 
facilitated, as a closer look at any of the above examples reveals. Moreover, in all of these cases, it is 
not just aspects of the self-generated environment that are recruited as sensory resources, but parts 
of the organism’s own body. In many cases, and in more distinctly philosophical terms, the body 
becomes part of the  realization base for the computations that allow the organism to perform its 
cognitive functions. MacIver ( 2009 ) refers to such computation as  morphological computation : 
computation that uses the organism’s own morphology as part of computing machinery in play (see 
also Paul,  2004 ; Pfeifer and Bongard,  2006 ). This recruitment of one’s own body as a computational 
resource can make itself visible over evolutionary time, as the variation one finds in bat pinnea 
suggests, as MacIver also suggests. The shape and character of the ear itself is a morphological 
 adaptation that forms part of the more complex behavioural adaptation of the echolocatory visual-
motor system, both of which have been the object of natural selection over many generations. 
As MacIver says, the ‘conformation of skin and supporting tissue of the ear in the bat forms a compu-
tational device that solves a key problem in the localization of prey in three-dimensional space’ 
(2009, p. 488). 
 To take an example closer to home ground, consider the optic flow, the pattern of apparent motion 
of objects and features in a visual scene that is created when an organism, such as a vertebrate, moves 
through space. When the optic field flow expands, it indicates, in conjunction with the organism’s 
movement, that it is approaching some fixed point, while contracting optic flows indicate a growing 
gap between organism and object (Gibson,  1979 , p. 227). Optic flow also crosses the divide between 
vertebrates and invertebrates. Recent research in invertebrate neuroethology on the visual systems of 
flies has focused on ways in which flies detect self-propulsion in order to stabilize their flight pattern. 
Facts about the geometry and physiological wiring of the fly’s photoreceptors simplify the computa-
tion of optic flow (see Egelhaaf et al.,  2002 ). For example, the dendrite of a tangential cell (VS6) likely 
integrates the input from sensors that detect optic flow patterns. The sensors (the ommatidia) that 
feed the neuron detecting a fly’s rolling motion (as when it tips to one side) are located in a row that 
lies parallel to the pattern of optic flow. Given that the change in optic flow characteristic of rolling 
is typically caused in the fly’s usual environment by the fly’s own motion, activity in this neuron 
indicates self-motion to the fly. Both of these physiological set-ups contribute to simplifying the 
neural computation of optic flow in ways that connect the fly’s visual system more effectively to 
action. They do so by distributing the overall computation over brain and body, not brain alone. 
 This kind of example provides the connection between what we might regard as the exotic cases of 
paradigmatic extended sensory systems (the echolocating bat, the electrically sensing fish) and more 
familiar and mundane examples of sensory systems. For  lots of creatures, including us , operate visually 
in part through optic flow, and through a variety of other means whereby aspects of the organism’s 
environment and their interaction with and manipulation of it are crucial to the visual tasks that they 
undertake. This is just what we should expect if sensing is a kind of doing, a kind of activity, a way in 
which organisms extract and exploit information from their environments through their bodily 
interactions with it. To connect this up directly with the earlier discussion of the embodiment of 
human vision: eye movements, foveation, saccading, head-turning and other forms of head move-
ment, and even squinting are all familiar ways in which organisms like us adjust their bodies with 
respect to their environments in order to improve their visual performance. Once sensory systems 
are conceptualized in dynamic terms, such that we consider not only their in-the-head functional 
decomposition but also their in-the-world functional role, there is pressure to see more and more of 
their activity as extending beyond the brain into the body and, as I shall argue, into the world. More 
externalist creep. 
 One natural response to this point is to acknowledge a role for both body and world in easing 
perceptual computation and generating perception, but dispute that either body or world have a 
 constitutive role in perception. To counter such a response, and to respond in turn to related objec-
tions to premises in the argument, I shall elaborate on the notion of active embodiment and its rela-
tion to extended vision. 
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1  15.6.  Integrative coupling, embodiment, and extended vision 
 I have been arguing that vision is embodied in a fairly strong sense (section 15.4), a conclusion 
 reinforced and connected to the extended vision thesis by consideration of the active, extended 
sensory systems of creatures like bats and electric fish, and reflection on the connection between such 
exotic cases and those that are more familiar (section 15.5). However, more needs to be said about 
the notion of embodiment itself in play, which brings us back to Premise (3): 
 (3) Visual processes are actively embodied (in a strong sense) just if in their normal operation in natural envi-
ronments, these processes are  coupled with bodily activities to form an  integrated system with  functional gain . 
 I introduce  functionally gainful, integrative coupling as a technical notion that can be explained in 
terms of the three component notions that it contains. 
 First, two processes are  coupled just if there are reliable causal connections between them. Since 
reliable causal connections between x and y entail a strong correlation between the presence of x and 
the presence of y, but (notoriously) correlation does not entail causation: coupling is a  stronger 
notion than mere correlation. The processes leading to the growth in height of the summer annuals 
planted in various parts of my garden are correlated but not coupled. Second, two processes form an 
 integrated system just if there are contexts in which they operate as one, as a whole, in the causal 
nexus, with causes affecting the resultant system as a whole, and the activities of that system as a 
whole producing certain effects. Although causal coupling need not produce an integrative system 
(two annuals planted very close together in my garden might have processes that are reliably coupled 
without those processes forming an integrative system), integrative systems result typically from 
causal coupling, and when they do, we have  integrative coupling . What bridges the gap between mere 
reliable coupling and the formation of integrative systems is the sharing of parts and activities. Third, 
an integratively coupled system shows  functional gain just when it either enhances the existing func-
tions of its coupled components, or manifests novel functions relative to those of any functions 
possessed by those components. 
 Before considering special features of the active embodiment of visual processing, note that func-
tionally gainful, integrative coupling is a general phenomenon that is commonplace in biological and 
social processes (see Wilson,  2005 , chapters 3–4 and 6–7). Consider human digestion, which involves 
the causal coupling of the activities of human body parts, such as the stomach, and the activities of 
microorganisms, like  Escherichia coli , that find a useful habitat in those parts. The resultant, integra-
tively coupled system, the human digestive system, has evolved over time to process foods more 
effectively than do any of its constituent processes alone, and so that system shows functional gain. 
Although the process of human digestion incorporates non-human components, such as those proc-
esses undertaken by  E. coli , note that these still take place in the digestive system  of a human being 
whose trajectory in the world is affected by these processes. The relevant processes (and, I think, 
systems) here are one kind of entity; the human being whose behaviour is governed, in part, by those 
processes, is another. 
 To take an example from the social domain, consider the process of pairwise cooperation as facili-
tated through explicit agreements to cooperate. I say ‘I’ll scratch your back, if you scratch mine’ and 
you say ‘Sure’. Here such agreements causally couple the activities of distinct individuals, who thus 
come to engage in pairwise cooperation. When things go well, this results in a dyadic cooperative 
system, one sustained by internalized and externally imposed sanctions, that shows functional gains 
in terms of problem-solving and desire satisfaction in certain contexts (e.g. those in which a pair of 
backs are to be scratched), as classic discussions of prisoner’s dilemma and other game-theoretic 
scenarios indicate. The fact is that there is a functionally gainful, integratively coupled system is 
compatible with the existence of identifiable parts, each with its own integrity and functions, and 
with the decomposition of that integrative system into those functional parts. 
 As these examples perhaps suggest, functionally gainful, integrative coupling can result in systems 
of various levels of durability and robustness over time and circumstance (cf. Wilson and Clark, 
 2009 , pp. 64–68). It does not require any form of lawful or other necessary connection between the 
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1 constituent components to the integrated system, or at least none more than reliable causation itself 
requires. For this reason, it is irrelevant whether there is integrative coupling, that there are possible 
(even actual) circumstances in which the constituent processes come apart, or in which there can be 
(or are) alternative constituent processes. For example, that bacteria other than  E.coli might play the 
role in digestion that  E.coli actually play does nothing to undermine the claim that stomachs and 
 E.coli are (together with much else) integratively coupled in the process of digestion as it actually 
occurs. Likewise, the vulnerability of an integratively coupled system to dissolution – as is pairwise 
cooperation through cheating and external threat – does not itself call into question whether there is 
integrative coupling when those threats are absent or non-effective. 
 Returning to visual processing and bodily activities, it seems that  everyone who is party to the 
debate over the embodiment of vision grants that there is causal coupling between (some aspects of) 
vision and (some aspects of) action, just as everyone who is party to the debate over the extended 
mind thesis grants that there is causal coupling between (some aspects of) cognition and (some 
aspects of) the beyond-the-skin environment. The real question, in both cases, is of the significance 
of such causal coupling. In the case of the active embodiment of visual processing, this is of signifi-
cance just when such coupling between visual processing and bodily activity produces integratively 
coupled systems and those systems manifest functional gain, in the senses just explained, through 
their normal operation in their natural environments. Such systems are often called  visuo-motor 
systems or  modules (e.g. Ballard, 1996; Milner and Goodale, 1998a and 1998b). If the overarching 
function of vision is the guidance of action through visual information, then such systems or modules 
have functional gain with respect to the functions of the constituent processes in such systems. 
 Of what sorts of visual process might this be true? Some might suggest, following Milner and 
Goodale (1998a and 1998b), that such processes are restricted to those subserved by the dorsal stream 
of visual processing, the  where system in primate visual systems, including motion perception and 
spatial orientation. This would leave those subserved by the ventral stream, the  what system , such as 
object recognition, beyond the reach of the kind of active embodiment thesis being used here to 
defend extended vision. While the distinction between dorsal and ventral streams of visual process-
ing has been articulated both functionally and anatomically in increasing detail over the past 40 years 
since Schneider ( 1969 ) first postulated the distinction based on work with hamsters, and Ungerleider 
and Mishkin ( 1982 ) developed it further on the basis of work with primates, I am sceptical that the 
distinction can serve adequately to demarcate (or contain) actively embodied visual processing in the 
manner suggested here. Many of the common types of visual processes that are invoked in theories 
of vision (visual attention, depth perception, shape perception, image change detection, even motion 
perception and objection recognition themselves) involve aspects or dimensions that fall under  both 
kinds of system. Accounts of these processes that approach empirical adequacy for the range of 
phenomena that each encompasses will almost certainly appeal to  both what and where systems 
(cf. also Hurley,  1998 , pp. 180–183). All require eye movements and associated bodily adjustments, 
for example in how they normally operate in natural environments. 
 To say that visual processes are actively embodied, then, is to say much more than that they 
are causally coupled, or to infer directly from the causal coupling of vision and action to their active 
embodiment, committing what some, following Adams and Aizawa ( 2001 ,  2008 ,  2009 ), call the 
 coupling-constitution fallacy (e.g. Block,  2005 ; Prinz,  2009 ). To elaborate on this second point, 
we need to be more explicit about precisely what this fallacy is. Often when Adams and Aizawa ( 2008 , 
pp. 93–99; 2009, pp. 81–83) ascribe this fallacy, they attribute to proponents of the extended mind 
thesis the following inference pattern: 
 a. Y is a cognitive process 
 b. X is causally coupled to Y. 
 c. X is part of a cognitive process 
 where X = activities involving some environmental structure, such as a notebook, and Y = some 
specific in-the-head processing, such as memory retrieval. Whatever one thinks of Adams and 
Aizawa’s claim to find such an inference pattern almost ubiquitously in the work of those defending 
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1 the extended mind thesis, the preceding argument contains no inference of this form, modified so 
that X = bodily actions or activities and Y = some specific in-the-head visual processing, such as the 
computation of depth from disparity or shading in visual cortex. Rather, the claim is that the causal 
coupling between visual processing and bodily activities  builds an integratively coupled system that is 
a causal entity in its own right, both subject to, and an agent of, causal influence . This is parallel to the 
way in which the causal coupling between body parts (like stomachs) and bacteria (like  E. coli ) builds 
an integratively coupled system that digests, and that between individuals, facilitated by explicit 
agreements, builds a dyadic group that cooperates pairwise to achieve particular goals. My view is 
that only by denying integrative coupling as a general phenomenon, or that it is a phenomenon that 
one finds in perception, can one challenge Premise (2) in the argument I have offered, but that would 
be to offer something other than the charge that the argument trades on a ‘coupling/constitution 
fallacy’. 
 Although Adams and Aizawa sometimes identify that fallacy as I have above, they also employ that 
term more broadly to pick out a larger family of faulty inferences that they believe proponents of 
extended cognition make. Prominent amongst these are defences of the extended mind thesis that 
involve an inference from claims about extended  systems to conclusions about extended  processes 
(e.g., Adams and Aizawa,  2008 . chapter 7; 2009, pp. 83–5). One might think that this is precisely the 
form that the coupling-constitution fallacy takes in the argument I have offered for the extended 
vision thesis, since that argument is cast explicitly in terms of the notion of integrated  systems . To link 
this transparently to the preceding schema, we might characterize this version of the putative fallacy 
as follows: 
 A. Y is a cognitive (perceptual) process 
 B1. X is causally coupled to Y. 
 B2. X and Y form an integrated system (with functional gain). 
 C. X is part of a cognitive (perceptual) process. 
 However, there are two reasons why this argument does not instantiate this fallacious pattern of 
inference. The first is that it does not begin with a premise like (A); in fact, it does not even contain 
a premise like (A); cf. my premises (1)–(4). The second is that it does not conclude with a conclusion 
like (C). Rather, it begins with a claim about a function of vision and how that function is achieved, 
and concludes with a claim about not the character of any component of the resulting system but 
with a claim about the character of that system itself. In offering a conception of visual processes as 
actively embodied, it depicts visual processing as a kind of  building or  construction , whereby bodily 
resources are recruited to enhance and even create visual functioning of various kinds. 
 Having spent some time articulating and defending (3) (and (2)) in the argument for extended 
vision, which takes us only to the claim that vision is actively embodied, not extended, what of the 
remaining premise, (4), that completes the argument? 
 (4) Visual systems that are embodied, in this sense, are also extended. 
 Given the conception of active embodiment that I have defended, (4) is less of a leap than it may 
sound initially, since the resultant integratively coupled system is one tracing an arc that reaches 
beyond the body of the organism. While proprioception and kinesthesia provide two sources for 
causal couplings between visual processing and bodily activities that remain within the bodily enve-
lope, simple visual observation of one’s own body and its movements over time provides a kind of 
feedback from vision to action that goes beyond that boundary. Much like the extended sensory 
systems of bats and electric fish, the visuo-motor systems with which we explore our visual world are 
not contained fully within the bodily boundary. While their extended sensory systems are realized, in 
part, by sonic and electromagnetic fields that they generate through their bodily movements, our 
extended visual systems are realized, in part, by optic flow fields that we generate through  our bodily 
movements. Neither the sonic, nor electromagnetic, nor optic flow fields that are used in perceptual 
processing, respectively, by bats, electric fish, or human beings, exist simply in the world independ-
ently of these organisms. Rather, they are created and sustained by the ongoing, active bodily engage-
ment of those organisms with their environments. Since this form of embodiment involves causally 
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1 coupling between organisms and physical structures that lie beyond the physical boundaries of those 
organisms, it is a kind of extended perception. In the case of human (and much other animal) vision, 
it is a kind of extended vision. 
 Perhaps this becomes clearer once we consider more explicitly the  dynamic dimension to visual 
processing (Hurley  1998 , chapter 10), acknowledging the fact that it is only through bodily move-
ment over time, especially of the eyes through physiological nystagmus, saccadic eye movements, 
and smooth pursuit and vergence movements (Palmer,  1999 , pp. 519–25), that there is a visual field 
with anything like the richness of our actual visual field at all. Visual representational cascades are 
built up dynamically over time, with repetitive feedback loops building the information that fills 
visual pathways, and that makes visual experience possible. Vision is a hungry constructive process, 
one that needs to be fed continually over time if it is to function as it is supposed to. While it feeds 
on inputs and produces outputs, those outputs themselves feed back over time into the system that 
produces them. The ‘it’ here is not a system that begins and ends in a part of the brain, nor even in 
the body. It involves a body that moves over time, and through a particular environment. Vision is 
extended. 
 15.7.  What of visual experience? 
 This brings me back, finally, to visual experience, and the role that it has come to play as a last refuge 
for individualistic intuitions. Recall Block’s claim that ‘the minimal constitutive supervenience base 
for perceptual experience is the brain and does not include the rest of the body’ (Block,  2005 , p. 271). 
Even putting aside (4) in the argument for extended vision, if the premises (1)–(3) in that argument 
are true, then we can see why this claim is false, at least of much perceptual experience. Moreover, it 
is false for much the reason that the corresponding claim is false of tactile and orgasmal experience: 
the visual processing that underlies visual experience, like the sensory processing that underlies these 
paradigmatic forms of bodily experience, is coupled integratively with bodily activity. 
 Strictly speaking, what (1)–(3) imply most directly is the falsity of the claim that the minimal 
constitutive supervenience base for perceptual  systems is the brain and does not include the rest of 
the body. Could one not concede that point, but insist, with Block, that perceptual experience is 
located firmly within the neural fold, inside not just the body, but the head, much in the way that one 
might allow that an air-conditioning  system might extend throughout a house but insist that  the air-
conditioning itself is localized  right here in a particular unit within that system, such as the compressor 
(cf. Adams and Aizawa,  2009 )?  That’s where the air-conditioning is taking place, just as all of the 
computing in a computational system (which might include screens, printers, hard drives, wireless 
signals, and more) takes place in the  central processing unit . In short, does not the explicit appeal in 
(1)–(3) in the argument to visual systems, an appeal that is then used to reach a conclusion about visual 
 experience , commit a fallacy that falls under the broad head of the coupling-constitution fallacy? 
 To be clear on this: no, it does not. While there is an inference being made from a claim about the 
visual system to a claim about visual processing  and so visual experience , the visual system just is the 
system in which visual processing takes place. Certainly, the neural pathways that subserve many 
aspects of vision are located in the head, and they will have some properties that are unique (and so 
not shared by other parts of the visual system) and not possessed by the system as a whole. Neurons 
fire; visual systems do so at best metaphorically or in some other sense. My claim is that  having visual 
experience and  being the place where visual experience happens are not amongst such properties. What 
is at issue is whether any amount or form of activity just in those pathways themselves is metaphysi-
cally sufficient for the full range of visual experience, or something suitably like our actual visual 
experience. For this reason, reports of some kind of experience or other in cases of partial paralysis of 
the body, or even of the more extensive paralysis brought on by the neuromuscular blockade of recep-
tors for the transmitter acetyl choline (Adams and Aizawa,  2008 , pp.166–72), offer no challenge to the 
argument I have offered, which is specifically about everyday vision and visual experience. The same 
is true of appeals to other cases, such as dreams, TMS stimulation to orgasm, or pain in phantom 
limbs, in which experience of some kind is putatively divorced from the kind of active embodiment 
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1 that is extended. Whether a modification of the argument offered here can be defended for the full 
range of experience is an issue I leave for further discussion (see also Wilson  2004 , chapter 9). 
 In fact, if visual processing itself is embodied actively in the way I have defined that notion here, it 
is hard to see how a feature generated by that processing in toto, visual experience, could fail to be 
embodied actively as well. To look to identify the realization base for visual experience in the brain 
would be more like aiming to locate digestion solely in the stomach, or fitness solely in the organism. 
Stomachs digest, and organisms have fitness, but at best they realize these properties partially. 
Sometimes we look inside organisms and their parts to identify what is metaphysically sufficient for 
the properties they possess, but sometimes we need to look to what those organisms, and those parts, 
in turn form a part of, as I have argued at length elsewhere (Wilson,  2004 , chapters 5–6). Visual 
experience, I am claiming, is a property that falls into this latter category. 
 Since I have argued that visual processing is not simply actively embodied but also, in light of that, 
extended, I think that the same reasoning above implies that visual experience, as an outcome of some 
forms of extended visual processing, is also extended. At the outset I noted that I have previously 
argued that at least some of the various phenomena that fall under the rubric of consciousness – 
higher order thought, introspection, and some aspects of attention – fall under the umbrella of the 
extended mind thesis, and that at least some aspects of visual experience should be viewed likewise 
(Wilson,  2004 , chapters 9–10). In appealing to the active embodiment of visual processing, and the 
link between that and extended vision, I have sought a way to reinforce that conclusion. Visual expe-
rience thus joins these other aspects of consciousness, processes of awareness, in further extending 
externalist creep from the intentional into the phenomenal. Thus, the space for individualistic refuge 
is smaller than many individualists have thought it is. 
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